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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 78-
2a-3(2)(h). 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. While Appellant and Appellee were married they were members of a limited 
liability corporation that owned a hotel. When the hotel was sold, the four members of 
the corporation signed an agreement that in part allocated proceeds of the sale among the 
members. The trial court found that the proceeds so allocated to Appellant and Appellee 
constituted marital property and considered evidence of the agreement. Did the trial 
court err when it considered evidence of the agreement allocating proceeds among the 
members? 
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2. The trial court found that amounts owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen constituted 
marital debt. The trial court further found that regular payments on the debt, as well as 
other testimony and exhibits, amounted to an acknowledgment of the debt and that the 
debt was therefore not barred by the statute of limitations. Did the trial court err when it 
declined to apply the statute of limitations to the debt owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen? 
3. The trial court found that amounts owed to Robert and LaRue Larson included debts 
on loans for business inventory and interest. Did the trial court err in so finding? 
Standard of Review 
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of the properties in a 
divorce action, Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982), the trial court has 
considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property interests, and its action are 
entitled to a presumption of validity. Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 
1983). Changes will be made only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of 
the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated 
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion. English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 
395, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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FACTS 
This appeal concerns a divorce and related property division. The parties were 
married on August 9, 1974. Because of difficulties in the marriage that the parties were 
unable to resolve, Appellee Alan Larsen filed for divorce. On February 23, 2004 a bench 
trial was held before Judge Paul D. Lyman. Judge Lyman divided the marital property, 
awarded child support, and entered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
After analysis of the parties' financial conditions, the trial court determined that 
the parties so commingled the assets and debts of their various business activities, and 
commingled business assets and debts with their personal assets and debts, that the court 
had to consider all assets and debts together when determining marital property. 
(Amended Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law f 19). 
The parties, along with two other individuals, had been members of RCI, LC, a 
limited liability company. (Trial Tr. p. 128:17-19). Prior to the divorce, RCI, LC sold a 
hotel it owned and the four members signed a settlement agreement distributing the 
proceeds of the sale among themselves. In order to determine a division of assets in the 
divorce action the trial court heard testimony regarding the settlement agreement and the 
amounts received by appellant and appellee from the sale. (Trial Tr. p. 12-13; 34-37; 
127-135; 178-180). Evidence was tendered and testimony proffered showing that 
appellee received $150,000.00 and that appellant received $200,000.00 from the sale of 
the hotel. (Trial Tr. p. 34:16-17; 35:4-6). 
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Over the years the parties had borrowed money from Robert and LaRue Larsen. 
The court heard testimony and took exhibits regarding these various debts. The court also 
heard testimony and took exhibits regarding payments made over time to service and in 
some cases retire various of these debts. (See, e.g. Exhibits 2, 12, 26, 27; Trial Tr. pp. 
42-47; Trial Tr. pp. 81-83; 85-92; Trial Tr. pp. 154-57). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
L The trial court properly heard evidence of a settlement agreement between the parties 
Under Utah law, The trial court's duty to make an equitable division of property in 
a divorce action encompasses all of the assets possessed by the parties. The trial court 
must distribute property between the parties in a fair, systematic fashion and should 
catagorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate property of 
one or the other. Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate 
property and fifty percent of the marital property. Once the trial court finds that an item is 
marital property, the law presumes that it will be shared equally between the parties 
unless unusual circumstances, memorialized in adequate findings, require otherwise. It is 
well established that the trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting the 
financial and property interests in a divorce case. 
It is the trial court's prerogative in divorce actions to make whatever disposition of 
property, including the rights fixed in settlement agreements, as it deems fair, equitable, 
and necessary for the protection and welfare of the parties. Although property settlements 
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should be given great weight in the court's determination of an equitable division, 
property settlements are not binding upon trial courts in divorce proceedings and the court 
need not necessarily abide by the terms of such agreements. 
Nevertheless, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it heard evidence of 
a settlement agreement the parties entered into concerning the sale of a motel, a portion of 
which they owned as members of a limited liability company. Appellant is mistaken. 
Under Utah law it is proper for the trial judge to hear evidence of settlement agreements 
in divorce cases. 
Appellant further asserts that evidence of the settlement agreement constituted 
surprise under Rule 59(a)(3), U.R.C.P. Appellant argues surprise based, not upon any lack 
of awareness of the evidence, but upon her claimed failure to anticipate that the trial 
court, in calculating a division of assets in the divorce, would consider amounts Appellant 
and Appellee received prior to the divorce from the proceeds of the sale of the hotel. 
Because the trial judge must characterize the property as marital property or individual 
property and then distribute property between the parties in a fair, systematic fashion, it 
cannot be a surprise that the trial court would hear evidence of the settlement agreement. 
Furthermore, under Utah law, a "surprise" at trial which could have been easily guarded 
against by utilization of available discovery procedures may not serve as a ground for a 
new trial. Here Appellant already had knowledge of the evidence and so cannot claim 
surprise. 
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Appellant asserts that the trial judge issued inconsistent rulings, first sustaining an 
objection to evidence that Appellant received $200,000.00 and Appellee received 
$150,000.00 for the sale of the hotel and then, ultimately, ruling that those were the 
amounts received by the parties. Here, Appellant misconstrues the trial record. 
Appellant objected to testimony as to why the parties received different amounts and 
asserted that the amounts due the members of RCI, LC were to be equal. The court ruled 
that the amounts from the sale to be credited the parties in the calculation of the division 
of assets would be equal. The court did not contradict itself or issue inconsistent rulings. 
Appellant construes evidence of the amounts received by the parties for the sale of 
the hotel as a settlement compromise subject to the exclusionary rule of Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 408. Rule 408 is inapplicable to the facts of this case since the amounts 
received by the parties for the sale of the hotel were never a claim which was disputed as 
to either validity or amount. Furthermore, the evidence in question was not to prove 
liability for or invalidity of the amount at issue. Rather, the evidence was to establish 
marital property for purposes of making an equitable division of property in the divorce. 
II The trial court did not commit error when it declined to apply the statute of limitations to the 
debt owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen 
Appellant attacks the sufficiency of the trial court's findings with regard to marital 
debts owed to Robert and Larue Larsen, claiming the court erred in finding that the statute 
of limitations was inapplicable to the rental agreement. Appellant must fail in this 
assertion since Appellant failed to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's 
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findings. The court found the debt supported by acknowledgment "by both parties 
through the payments, exhibits, and credible testimony." Yet Appellant limits discussion 
of evidence of the debt's status to whether a particular exhibit constitutes 
acknowledgment of the debt. The trial court heard other evidence, ignored in Appellant's 
brief, that supported the court's finding that the statute of limitations did not apply. 
Furthermore, Appellant's argument as to the meaning of the exhibit mentioned above was 
raised for the first time in Appellant's Brief and therefore may not be considered. 
III. The Trial Court did not commit error when it found that interest and inventory were apart 
of the marital debt 
Appellant asserts that the court found that Appellant acknowledged a debt owed 
for inventory and/or interest on the amount owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen. However, 
there is no indication in the record that the trial court made any such finding. There is 
likewise no indication in the record that Appellant raised these points before the trial 
court. There is no discussion whatsoever in the record regarding the interest or inventory 
amounts to which Appellant refers. Appellant's argument is raised for the first time in 
Appellant's Brief and therefore may not be considered. Further, Appellant's Brief fails to 
discuss any evidence related to a finding that Appellant acknowledged the inventory or 
interest debt, much less does Appellant marshal the evidence supporting the findings as 
required under the law and then demonstrate that, despite the evidence, the findings are 
clearly erroneous. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court properly heard evidence of a settlement agreement between the parties 
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it heard evidence of a settlement 
agreement the parties entered into concerning the sale of a motel, a portion of which they 
owned as members of a limited liability company. However the court was correct to 
consider evidence of the settlement agreement as doing so was necessary in order for it to 
distribute property between the parties in a fair, systematic fashion. 
The trial court's duty to make an equitable division of property in a divorce action 
encompasses all of the assets possessed by the parties. Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308, 
1310 (Utah 1982) (quoting Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978). The 
trial court must distribute property between the parties in a fair, systematic fashion and 
should "catagorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate 
property of one or the other. Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her 
separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 
1172 (Utah App. 1990). Once the trial court finds that an item is marital property, the law 
presumes that it will be shared equally between the parties unless unusual circumstances, 
memorialized in adequate findings, require otherwise. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 
(Utah App. 1993). It is well established that the trial judge has considerable latitude of 
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests in a divorce case. See, e.g. 
Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1974). 
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The trial court found that the couple did not keep separate accounts and mingled 
together their personal assets and liabilities with those of their various business ventures. 
(Amended Findings of Facts & Conclusions of Law, f^ 19). This presented a challenge for 
the court in determining how best to adjust the financial and property interests in the case. 
In response to Appellant's objection to evidence of the settlement agreement, the trial 
judge said, "The testimony is quite clear that everything was mixed and mingled." (Trial 
Tr. P. 128:6-7), and later: "Fve got to come up with some number, because Fm going to 
find that these parties owned interest in these things and they were married at the time this 
happened." (Trial Tr. p. 132:18-21). 
As will be discussed below, the trial court properly determined that evidence of the 
settlement agreement was necessary in order to make an equitable division of property 
and to distribute property between the parties in a fair, systematic fashion. The trial court 
was correct to consider evidence of the Settlement Agreement because the trial court must 
determine whether to be bound by its terms. Consideration of the evidence was not a 
surprise as contemplated by U.R.C.P. 59 as asserted by Appellant. The trial court did not 
reverse itself or make inconsistent rulings as asserted by Appellant. The settlement 
agreement was not a compromise or an attempt to compromise a claim which was 
disputed as to either validity or amount and so, contrary to Appellant's assertion, U.R.E. 
408 does not apply to the facts of this case. 
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A. It was proper for the Trial Court to consider evidence of the Settlement Agreement as it 
is the Trial Court's prerogative to determine whether to be bound by the Agreement's 
terms 
It is the trial court's prerogative in divorce actions to make whatever disposition of 
property, including the rights fixed in settlement agreements, as it deems fair, equitable, 
and necessary for the protection and welfare of the parties. Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 
1080, 1082 (Utah, 1977); Mathie v. Mathie, 363 P.2d 779, 782-83 (Utah, 1961). 
Although property settlements should be given great weight in the court's determination 
of an equitable division, property settlements are not binding upon trial courts in divorce 
proceedings and the court need not necessarily abide by the terms of such agreements. 
Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P. 2d 184, 185 (Utah 1977); Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562, 
563 (Utah 1983); Nunley v. Nunley, 757 P.2d 473,475 . Nevertheless, Appellant asserts 
that the trial court erred when it heard evidence of a settlement agreement the parties 
entered into concerning the sale of a motel, a portion of which they owned as members of 
a limited liability company. 
In marriage, the parties mingled together their personal assets and liabilities with 
those of their various business ventures. (Amended Findings of Facts & Conclusions of 
Law, f 19). This made it necessary for the trial judge to closely examine evidence of the 
couple's financial and property interests. The Trial Court was within its discretion to hear 
evidence of the Settlement Agreement to make whatever disposition of property, 
including the rights fixed in settlement agreements, as it deemed fair and equitable. 
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B. Evidence of the Settlement Agreement was not a surprise which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against as it was evidence of marital property that the court would 
properly consider in devising a fair distribution of property between the parties 
Appellant argues that evidence of the amounts received by the parties for the sale 
of the hotel constituted unfair surprise. Rule 59(a)(3), U.R.C.P. provides grounds for a 
new trial if there was accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. This section requires that the moving party show that ordinary prudence 
was exercised to guard against the surprise. Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 567 
P.2d 174,n 176 (Utah 1977). Appellant does not argue that unfair surprise was caused by 
the introduction of any evidence or testimony about which she had no prior awareness. 
Instead, Appellant argues surprise based upon her claimed failure to anticipate that the 
trial court, in calculating a division of assets in the divorce, would consider amounts 
Appellant and Appellee received prior to the divorce from the proceeds of the sale of the 
hotel. (Appellant's Brief p. 4). 
The trial court's duty to make an equitable division of property in a divorce action 
encompasses all of the assets possessed by the parties. Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308, 
1310 (Utah 1982) (quoting Englert v. Englert 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978). The 
trial court must distribute property between the parties in a fair, systematic fashion and 
should "catagorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate 
property of one or the other. Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her 
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separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 
1172 (Utah App. 1990). Once the trial court finds that an item is marital property, the law 
presumes that it will be shared equally between the parties unless unusual circumstances, 
memorialized in adequate findings, require otherwise. Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 
(Utah App. 1993). 
Here, the trial court found the proceeds from the hotel to be marital property, 
saying, "I've got to come up with some number, because I'm going to find that these 
parties owned interest in these things and they were married at the time this happened." 
(Trial Tr. p. 132:18-21). It is well established that the trial judge has considerable latitude 
of discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests in a divorce case. See, e.g. 
Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1974). In light of the trial court's duty to make 
an equitable division of property and that this duty encompasses all of the assets 
possessed by the parties, it is simply not credible for Appellant to claim surprise that the 
trial court took into account amounts received by the parties before the divorce. 
If Appellant felt that the amounts received for the sale of the hotel should not have 
been shared equally between the parties, Appellant could have argued to the trial court 
whatever special circumstances would, under Hall, require otherwise. Instead, Appellant 
merely objected to any testimony regarding the question. The actions of the trial court are 
presumed valid and it is Appellant's burden to prove such a serious inequity as to amount 
to a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 700. 
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Furthermore, under Utah law, a "surprise" at trial which could have been easily 
guarded against by utilization of available discovery procedures may not serve as a 
ground for a new trial. Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982). Here, Appellant 
had full knowledge of the agreement and can hardly claim surprise as contemplated by the 
Rule. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it considered evidence of the 
amounts the parties received from the sale of the hotel, nor did such evidence constitute 
surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. 
C. Appellant misconstrues the record in arguing that The Court reversed itself and issued 
an inconsistent ruling 
Appellant asserts that the trial court reversed itself and issued an inconsistent 
ruling. It did not. Appellant claims that the trial court sustained Appellant's objection to 
testimony that Appellee received $150,000.00 for the sale of the hotel and implies that the 
court did so in part because " there was no evidence to support the amount...as a correct 
representation of Petitioner's proceeds." (Appellant's Brief p. 5). But the court did not 
sustain any objection to testimony or evidence that Appellee received $150,000.00 for the 
sale of the hotel. Furthermore, when Appellant objected that there was no evidence to 
support the amount as a correct representation of Petitioner's proceeds, the court did not 
sustain Appellant's objection, but instead invited Appellant to cross examine Appellee 
under oath. (Trial Tr. p. 37:1-5) 
What the court did sustain was Appellant's later objection to witness testimony 
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about why the amounts received by Appellant and Appellee were different. (Trial Tr. p. 
131:6-24). Appellant's counsel told the court: 
"...[A]ll we were really trying to do is take the sales price of 4.2 million dollars, 
subtract out all of the reasonable expenses that should be subtracted out to get to an 
equity, and then divide that by four. 
"We did all of that, and the process resulted in my client getting $200,000. Now 
they're going to say, "No we overpaid her."" (Trial Tr. p. 134:1-8). 
The court informed Appellant that if Appellant's objection were sustained, the 
court would find that both parties should receive $200,000.00 credit for the sale of the 
hotel. (Trial Tr. p. 132:18-22). Appellant asserts that this is inconsistent with the court's 
ultimate finding that Appellant received $200,000.00 and Appellee received $150,000.00. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 5). But the court was clear that it was not ruling that the parties had 
each received $200,000.00 for the sale of the hotel. The court meant instead that each 
party should have received $200,000.00 and that the court would take that into account 
when calculating the division of assets. (Trial Tr. 135:7-12). 
Appellant misconstrues the trial record in asserting the trial judge issued 
inconsistent rulings. The rulings of the court were consistent. The court never sustained 
any objection to evidence that Appellant received $200,000.00 and Appellee received 
$150,000.00 for the sale of the hotel. When Appellant objected to testimony as to why 
the parties received different amounts and asserted that the amounts due the members of 
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RCI, LC were to be equal amounts, the court ruled that the amounts from the sale to be 
credited the parties in the calculation of the division of assets would be equal. 
D. Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 408 does not apply to evidence of the settlement agreement 
since the settlement agreement was not a compromise or an attempt to compromise a claim 
that was disputed as to validity or amount 
Appellant construes evidence of the amounts received by the members of RCI, LC 
for the sale of the hotel as a settlement compromise subject to the exclusionary rule of 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 408. Rule 408 provides that evidence of "accepting or 
offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting 
to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not 
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount.95 Rule 408 is 
inapplicable to the facts of this case since the amounts received by the parties for the sale 
of the hotel were never a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount. 
Furthermore, the evidence in question was not to prove liability for or invalidity of the 
amount at issue. Rather, the evidence was to establish marital property for purposes of 
making an equitable division of property in the divorce. 
The trial court's duty to make an equitable division of property in a divorce action 
encompasses all of the assets possessed by the parties. Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308, 
1310 (Utah 1982) (quoting Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978). The 
trial court must distribute property between the parties in a fair, systematic fashion and 
should "catagorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate 
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property of one or the other. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah App. 1990). 
Furthermore, property settlements are not binding upon trial courts in divorce proceedings 
and the court need not necessarily abide by the terms of such agreements. Naylor v. 
Nqylor, 563 P. 2d 184, 185 (Utah 1977); Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562, 563 (Utah 
1983); Nunley v. Nunley, 757 P.2d 473, 475 . 
Since amounts received by the parties for the sale of the hotel were not a claim 
disputed as to validity or amount, and since evidence of such amounts was not to prove 
liability or invalidity of the amounts, and since trial courts in divorce proceedings have 
discretion whether to even abide by the terms of settlement agreements, Rule 408 is 
inapplicable to this case. 
POINT II 
The trial court did not commit error when it declined to apply the statute of 
limitations to the debt owed to Robert and LaRue Larson 
Appellant attacks the sufficiency of the trial court's findings with regard to marital 
debts owed to Robert and Larue Larsen, claiming the court erred in finding that the statute 
of limitations was inapplicable to the rental agreement. Appellant must fail in this 
assertion since Appellant failed to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's findings 
and raised an argument as to the meaning of one of the exhibits for the first time in 
Appellant's Brief. 
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A. Appellant neither marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's findings that 
the statute of limitations on the rent debt was inapplicable nor demonstrated that such 
findings were clearly erroneous 
Appellant claims the trial court erred in finding that the statute of limitations was 
inapplicable with regards to the rent debt. The trial court found that an amount of debt for 
unpaid rent was not barred by the statute of limitations for purposes of including it as 
marital debt. (Amended Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, TJ19). The court 
specifically found that the debt was not barred by the statute of limitations because 
regular payments on the debt had kept it alive. Id. ("The Court finds that the majority of 
this debt of $101,000 is for past unpaid rent upon which the parties have made regular 
enough payments to keep this debt alive in the Court's opinion."). The court went on to 
say, "This debt is clearly not barred by the statute of limitations, it was acknowledged by 
both parties through the payments, exhibits, and credible testimony received here today." 
Id. 
Appellant's brief limits its discussion of the issue to a narrow slice of the evidence 
the court heard in connection with the rent debt, arguing that a particular exhibit, Exhibit 
27, does not constitute acknowledgment of the debt for purposes of determining whether 
the statute of limitations has run. But Appellant ignores other evidence considered by the 
court. For instance, the court accepted and considered Exhibits 2, 12, and 26 all of which 
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Appellant relied on to show payments made over time for rent. (Trial Tr. pp. 42-47). 
Appellant also ignores witness testimony concerning amounts paid over time for rent. 
(Trial Tr. pp. 81-83; 85-92 ). Furthermore, Appellant's own counsel acknowledged rent 
payments made at least as far back as the year 2000 - an acknowledgment that 
undermines Appellant's argument that the debt is barred and supports the court's contrary 
finding. (Trial Tr. pp. 154-57). 
In order to prevail in overturning the trial court's findings, Appellant must marshal 
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that, despite such evidence, 
the findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence 
and, therefore, clearly erroneous. Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991); 
see also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)._Appellant has neither marshaled the evidence in support of 
the trial courf s findings nor demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous. 
Appellant instead cites only the evidence that Appellate hopes will support Appellate's 
desired outcome, and ignores evidence supportive of the trial couifs findings. 
Evidence heard by the trial court supporting the finding that the debt is not barred 
by the statute of limitations includes evidence of regular payments made on the debt. 
Under Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25 (1) an action on a contract, obligation, or liability not 
founded upon an Instrument in writing may l>e commenced within four years after the last 
charge is made or the last payment is received. Further, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 says, 
"In any case found in contract, when any part of the principal has been paid, or an 
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acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same, 
shall have been made, an action may be brought within the period prescribed for the same 
after such payment, acknowledgment or promise;..." Here, the trial court considered 
evidence of payments made on the debt and determined that the debt was not barred. 
Appellant should not prevail in overturning the trial court's findings as Appellant 
neither marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's findings that the statute of 
limitations on the rent debt was inapplicable nor demonstrated that such findings were 
clearly erroneous. 
B. Appellant's argument that Exhibit 27 was intended only to demonstrate errors in 
Appellee9 $ calculations is a new argument raised for the first time on appeal 
Appellant argues in Appellant's Brief that Exhibit 27 was prepared "to 
demonstrate only for illustrative purposes that if the amount of the claimed rent owed to 
Robert and LaRue Larson were accepted, that Respondent's [Appellant's] equity in the 
business would still be an amount grater than had been previously offered by Petitioner to 
Respondent to resolve that part of the case." (Appellant's Brief, p. 12). But the portion 
of the record sited by Appellant to support this argument tells a very different story. "We 
were trying to figure out how much my client should get for Fashion Furniture. We had 
taken care of the motel matter and were trying to resolve Fashion Furniture. So these 
exhibits, the one No. 27 was prepared simply as her calculations of what she thought the 
value of the business was, what she thought she should receive." (Appellant's Brief p. 
12, quoting Trial Tr. pp. 136-37). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the trial court must address an argument 
before it maybe considered on appeal. OngInternational (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 
850 P.2d 447, 455n.31 (Utah 1993). An argument is deemed to have been raised before 
the trial court if the trial court had an opportunity to enter findings of fact and/or 
conclusions of law. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 788, 801 (Utah App. 1987). 
Here, Appellant's argument from Appellant's Brief was not made to the trial court. 
Appellant's argument that Exhibit 27 was prepared "to demonstrate only for illustrative 
purposes that if the amount of the claimed rent owed to Robert and LaRue Larson were 
accepted, that Respondent's [Appellant's] equity in the business would still be an amount 
grater than hadl)een previously offered," was not addressed by the trial court and the trial 
court had no opportunity to enter findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding 
Appellant's claim. Appellant's argument therefore may not be considered on appeal. 
POINT in 
The Trial Court did not commit error when it found that interest and 
inventory were a part of the marital debt 
Appellant attacks the sufficiency of the trial courf s findings with regard to marital 
debts owed to Robert and Larue Larsen, claiming the court erred in finding that a debt 
was owed for inventory and interest. Appellanf s Brief asserts that the court found that 
Appellant acknowledged a debt owed for inventory and/or interest on the amount owed to 
Robert and LaRue Larsen, (Appellanf s Brief, p. 13). However, there Is no indication in 
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the record that the trial court made any such finding, so it is difficult for Appellee to know 
just what Appellant is arguing and how to respond. There is likewise no indication in the 
record that Appellant raised these points before the trial court. There is no discussion 
whatsoever in the record regarding the interest or inventory amounts to which Appellant 
refers. Appellant's argument is raised for the first time in Appellant's Brief and therefore 
may not be considered. Further, Appellant's Brief fails to discuss any evidence related to 
a finding that Appellant acknowledged the inventory or interest debt, much less does 
Appellant marshal the evidence supporting the findings as required under the law and 
then demonstrate that, despite the evidence, the findings are clearly erroneous. 
A. Appellant's argument that the trial court erroneously concluded Appellant 
acknowledged debts for inventory and interest is a new argument raised for the first time 
on appeal 
Appellant's assertion that the trial court found that Appellant acknowledged a debt 
for inventory and interest is made for the first time in Appellant's Brief. There is no 
mention in the trial record of any such finding by the trial court and Appellee has doubts 
as to whether Appellant is correct. Nevertheless, as Appellant's assertion is argued for 
the first time on appeal, Appellant's claim that the trial court found acknowledgment of 
the debts should not be considered. 
To Preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue before 
the trial court. Hart v. Salt Lake City, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah App. 1997). The trial 
court must address an argument before it may be considered on appeal. Ong 
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International (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455n.31 (Utah 1993). An 
argument is deemed to have been raised before the trial court if the trial court had an 
opportunity to enter findings of fact and/or conclusions of law. James v. Preston, 746 
P.2d 788, 801 (Utah App. 1987). Even if the trial court did find acknowledgment of 
inventory and interest debts as Appellant asserts, Appellant made no mention of it until 
the time of Appellant's appeal and the issue therefore should not be considered. 
B. Even if the trial court found that Appellant acknowledged the debts for inventory and 
interest, Appellant neither marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's findings 
nor demonstrated that such findings were clearly erroneous 
In order to prevail in overturning the trial court's findings, Appellant must marshal 
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that, despite such evidence, 
the findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence 
and, therefore, clearly erroneous. Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991); 
see also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Appellant has neither marshaled the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings nor demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous. 
Appellant instead cites only the evidence that Appellate hopes will support Appellate's 
desired outcome, and ignores evidence supportive of the trial court's findings. Appellant 
should therefore not prevail in overturning the trial court's findings. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly heard evidence of a settlement agreement between the parties. It 
was proper for the Trial Court to consider evidence of the Settlement Agreement as it is the Trial 
Court's prerogative to determine whether to be bound by the Agreement's terms. Evidence of 
the Settlement Agreement was not a surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against as it was evidence of marital property that the court would properly consider in devising a 
fair distribution of property between the parties. Appellant misconstrues the record in arguing 
that The Court reversed itself and issued an inconsistent ruling. Finally, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 408 does not apply to evidence of the settlement agreement since the settlement agreement 
was not a compromise or an attempt to compromise a claim that was disputed as to validity or 
amount. 
The trial court did not commit error when it declined to apply the statute of limitations to 
the debt owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen. Appellant neither marshaled the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings that the statute of limitations on the rent debt was inapplicable nor 
demonstrated that such findings were clearly erroneous. Appellant ignored evidence used by the 
court to determine that the debt was not barred. Appellant's argument that Exhibit 27 was 
intended only to demonstrate errors in Appellee's calculations is a new argument raised for the 
first time on appeal. 
The Trial Court did not commit error when it found that interest and inventory were a part 
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of the marital debt. Appellant's argument that the trial court erroneously concluded Appellant 
acknowledged debts for inventory and interest is a new argument raised for the first time on 
appeal. Even if the trial court found that Appellant acknowledged the debts for inventory and 
interest, Appellant neither marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's findings nor 
demonstrated that such findings were clearly erroneous. 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's appeal should be denied on all counts and the trial 
courts well-reasoned findings and order should be upheld. Appellee Alan Larsen asks for an 
award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal. 
DATED this 1 U day of / ^ ° ^ ^2095 
DOUGLA8T. NEELEY 
Attorney for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on this day of November, 2005,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Brief Of Appellee, postage prepaid, to Gary H. Weight, Attorney for 
Appellant, at 290 West Center Street, P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah, 84603-0200. 
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ADDENDUM 
Amended Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law 
Trial Transcript 
DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290 
Attorney for Petitioner 
1st South Main, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 7 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: (435)835-5055 
Facsimile: (435)835-5057 
IN THE SLXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALAN R. LARSEN : AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT & 
Petitioner, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : Civil No. 034600001 
DEBRA D. LARSEN : JUDGE PAUL D. LYMAN 
Respondent. : 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 23rd day of February, 2004, before the 
Honorable Judge Paul D. Lyman. Petitioner appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, 
Douglas L. Neeley. Respondent appeared in person and was represented by her attorney, Gary 
Weight. The Court, having received evidence, the parties having testified in support of their 
pleadings, and the Court having heard argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises, now makes and enters its: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Petitioner is a bona fide resident of Sevier County, State of Utah, and has been for 
more than three (3) months immediately prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife, having been married on August 9, 1974, 
in the City of Richfield, County of Sevier, State of Utah. 
3. During the course of the marriage, the parties have experienced difficulties that cannot be 
reconciled. The Petitioner should be granted a divorce from the Respondent based upon these 
irreconcilable differences which divorce should become final upon its entry. 
4. During the marriage, there have been three (3) children born as issue of this marriage, two 
(2) of which have reached their majority. The remaining minor child of the parties is Dalian Robert, 
born July 7, 1988. 
5. The Respondent is a fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody, and control 
of the minor child, subject to liberal visitation with the Petitioner that includes, at a minimum, the 
frequency and schedule outlined in Utah Statute §30-3-35. 
r 
6. Both of the parties should be permanently enjoined from saying or doing anything in the 
presence of the minor child (or in such a manner that the child will become aware of the party's 
comments or actions) to convey any negative information, beliefs, feelings, etc., regarding the other 
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parent, or doing or saying anything that would in any way harm the relationship between the child or 
the other parent. Both parents are to encourage the creation and maintenance of a strong and healthy 
relationship between the other parent and the child. In no event shall either party demean or 
disparage the parent in the presence of the child, or permit any third party to do so. 
7. It is important for the minor child to have contact with his older sisters, his paternal 
grandparents, and other relations as well. The Respondent should make a concerted effort to 
encourage and support these relationships, as they should encourage and support the minor child's 
relationship with the Respondent. This may involve allowing extra time for visits, allowing visits in 
her home, etc. 
8. It is reasonable and proper that both parties be required to maintain in effect a policy of 
dental, health, and accident insurance, at all times that such may be available through their respective 
employers at a reasonable cost, with the minor child of the parties named beneficiary thereunder. 
Further, each party should pay one-half (14) of any deductible amounts, co-payments, and one-half 
(Vi) of all non-covered medical and dental expenses (including, but not limited to, accidents, surgery, 
orthodontics, ophthalmology, optometry [including eyeglasses], cavities/fillings, psychological and 
or psychiatric care, hospitalization, broken limbs, physical therapy, continuing illnesses, allergies, etc.) 
for said minor child. 
Larsen v Larsen 
Amended Findings Of Fact 
& Conclusions Of Law 
Page 4 
9. A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and 
payment of the expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment. 
10. Each party should reimburse the other party within 30 days for his or her share of any 
medical or dental expense that has been paid by the other party that are not covered by health 
insurance for the child. 
11. Both parties should be entitled to receive a credit in addition to the base child support 
amount for one-half (14) of the monthly medical insurance premiums actually paid for the benefit of 
the minor child of the parties. 
12. The custodial parent should be ordered to provide a copy of the Decree of Divorce to 
each creditor providing medical or dental services for the minor child. Pursuant to UCA §15-4-
637(1953), each creditor should be notified by the custodial parent that the creditor is prohibited from 
making claim for unpaid medical expenses against a parent who has paid in full that share of the 
medical and dental expenses required to be paid by that parent by the Decree of Divorce. Each 
creditor receiving a copy of the Decree of Divorce should also be notified that the creditor is 
prohibited from making a negative credit report or report of debtor's repayment practices or credit 
history regarding a parent who has paid in full that share of the medical and dental expenses required 
to be paid by that parent by the Decree of Divorce. 
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13. Each party should pay one-half (V2) of the cost of the custody evaluation, the business 
evaluation, and the appraisal on the home. By March 1, 2004, the parties should exchange 
documentation in regards to the amounts they have paid and the remaining balances. 
14. The Petitioner should be awarded the income tax deduction for the minor child for the 
tax year 2003. The Respondent should receive the deduction for 2004, the Petitioner for 2005, and 
the Respondent for 2006. 
15. In regards to alimony, the Court finds that the parties jointly owned the van and the 
furniture business together from 1984 until November of 2002. Both parties had an equal share in 
the job responsibilities in this business and all income derived from the business, including the 
payment of insurance, house payments, credit card payments, and other extra payments made by the 
business, was joint income to the parties, even though Mr. Larsen was given credit for the income 
from the sole proprietor business for social security purposes, it was still joint income. Consequently, 
the historical earnings for the parties are exactly the same and alimony is not appropriate in this case. 
16. The Respondent is entitled to the standard formula for determining retirement money due 
to her. Because the parties chose to put everything under Mr. Larsen's name for income and social 
security purposes from 1984 to 2002, that will be the time period that social security should be 
treated for retirement. The denominator in the formula will be the period of the marriage with the 
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period from 1984 to 2002 as the numerator. The Court is considering this as retirement, but will not 
require a QDRO to be prepared because the Court does not believe you can file them against the 
Federal Government, but that formula will be applied. The Court is not directing Mr. Larsen to apply 
for social security, but whenever he chooses to do so, that portion set out above, using that formula, 
will be owed to Mrs. Larsen at the time he begins receiving those benefits. 
17. In regards to the historical incomes of the parties, the Court cannot use those incomes 
because it appears to the Court that we have a business that is going through its last phases, it's going 
out of business, the hotel has been sold, Mrs. Larsen has no income and hasn't had any for some time. 
As set forth above, the parties had equal joint income for many, many years. Consequently, the Court 
is going to find that for child support purposes, Mr. Larsen has $1,500 per month in income earning 
ability at this time. Mrs. Larsen has income earning potential at $6.00 an hour for a full-time job, 
which computes to $1,032 per month and the Court is going to impute that income to her for child 
support determination, which the Court thinks is reasonable. Mrs. Larsen needs to get a job. Both 
of these earnings appear to be temporary and the Court would anticipate that either one of these 
parties, or both, will be filing a modification in the near future, based upon a change of the earnings 
of the parties, since their monthly claimed expenses exceed and in most cases triple or quadruple what 
they are both trying to tell the Court they can earn. 
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18. Based upon the foregoing, the Petitioner should pay $209 per month to the Respondent 
as child support for the minor child beginning February 15,2004, and each month thereafter until the 
child reaches 18, graduates from high school, whichever occurs last, or until modified by the Court 
19. The Court finds specifically in determining property values and to what is owed and not 
owed by the parties in regards to debts, both personal and business, that the parties commingled the 
assets and liabilities of the furniture business, the hotel business, and the personal business, which is 
evidenced by the way they used their business assets to purchase or finance personal assets, used their 
personal credit cards to finance and pay business debts, and used business assets and credit to pay 
other business debts or to acquire other business assets. For example, they used their personal van, 
which was paid for, to finance and pay debt incurred in the furniture business. The Court simply has 
to treat the entire assets and debts as a group. The testimony is that in regards to the sale of the 
motel, Mrs. Larsen received $200,000 and Mr. Larsen received $150,000, which leaves a $50,000 
shortfall. The parties have stipulated that the business values and debts would be determined as of 
November 1, 2002, not today, consequently the Court will accept this date for its division of assets 
and debts. In addition, all of the evidence has come in with that date as the date to use in dividing 
up the assets and debts. The Court will use November 1, 2002, for its determination in dividing the 
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assets and debts of the parties, in valuing the assets of the parties, and in equitably dividing the same. 
That Court has not addressed the values, debts, and assets as the attorneys argued it should, 
but rather as the Court determines the divisions to be equitable given the evidence and testimony 
received. 
First, the Court will lay out the Robert and LaRue Larsen debts. These are monies owed to 
them by the parties. Respondent's Exhibit No. 26 acknowledges the debt owed for back rent and 
loans made to the parties. Petitioner offered Exhibit No. 12 which also illustrates, verifies, and 
acknowledges the same debt in the sum of $101,125.93 as ofNovember 1, 2002. Each party offered 
an exhibit using the exact same figure and it appears to the Court that at an earlier date, each of the 
parties acknowledged and agreed that this sum was owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen. This debt 
did include the $15,000 loan. However, the $42,000 was paid back with interest and this figure of 
$101,125.93 does not include this loan. When the Court goes through the schedules, the two (2) 
loans are clearly accounted for with the $42,000 having been paid, with interest, in September of 
2001. The Court finds that the majority of this debt of $101,000 is for past unpaid rent upon which 
the parties have made regular enough payments to keep this debL^liveinJiiei^cairt's opinion. This 
debt is clearly not barred by the statute of limitations, it was acknowledged by both parties through 
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the payments, exhibits, and credible testimony received herejtoday^ The Court finds that this debt is 
Alan's and he is to hold Debbie harmless on this debt. 
20. Now, turning to the other business debts and again using the November 1, 2002, date, 
the first debt illustrated on Exhibit 6 and then on Exhibit 18. It showed that there was $18,978.49 
in the furniture business account on November 1, 2002. The Court has gone through and added the 
checks, not accepting Petitioner's counsel's figure, and the Court comes up with $27,468.18, a 
shortfall of $8,489.69. The second debt the Court has considered is the accounts payable debt from 
Exhibit 7 where the parties agreed the $7,132.31 was duplicate of Exhibit 6 and 7, the Court did not 
take it off of Exhibit 6, but the Court is taking it off of Exhibit 7. The Court finds then that from the 
$46,811.46, less the $7,132.31, the net accounts payable are $39,679.15 as of November 1, 2002. 
21. The next debt the Court considers are the credit card debt balances as of November 1, 
2002, that come off of Exhibits 3 and 29. The total there was modified by the parties during trial and 
the Court finds that the total owed on the credit cards as of November 1, 2002, was $22,742.23. 
22. The second mortgage on the house was clearly done for business purposes and again 
illustrates the commingling of the business assets and debts with the parties' personal assets and 
debts. The Court finds that the balance owed on the second mortgage as of November 1, 2002, was 
$21,869.38 which is found on Exhibit no. 10. Likewise, the van debt was clearly incurred by the 
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parties for business purposes and the Court finds that the debt owed is $10,731.14, exactly as stated 
on Exhibit no. 11. Lastly, the Court heard testimony in regards to the credit card debt incurred after 
the parties' separation. Alan said the debt was incurred, Debbie said it wasn't, that is from Exhibits 
4 and 30. The Court is finding that Debbie did in fact incur $5,623.04 of credit card debt after the 
parties' separation of November 2002. 
23. Having considered all of the debts, the Court finds the total to be $109,134.63 in debts 
which are business debts which should be paid by Alan and hold Debbie harmless from those debts, 
which the Court notes include the second mortgage and the van debt, which will become relevant 
below. 
24. Now there are a couple of other loose ends that need to be addressed by the Court. 
There are two (2) debts that Debbie proved she should have received one-half (Vi) of. First, in 
regards to the tax refund. The Court finds that Debbie's story is more believable than Alan's story 
and the Court finds that the refund was in fact $ 1,186.19. The second amount was the balance in the 
parties' personal checking account in Zions Bank in November of 2002. The total of those debts the 
Court finds is $5,761.99, which Alan received. One-half (Vi) of those two (2) amounts is $2,881, 
which should be paid or credited to Debbie. 
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25. On the other hand, we have Alan who paid for the family's health insurance, Alan and 
Debbie's life insurance, and the van insurance. The portion that is for the family health insurance is 
a family obligation and if someone would have gotten sick or hurt, the parties would have had to pay 
those expenses, so the Court declines to give Alan any credit for those payments. However, on the 
life insurance in the sum of $4,912 and the van insurance of $978.40, these were all for Debbie's 
benefit, totaling $5,890.40, the Court does not consider those payments, made by Alan, to be a family 
obligation, and Alan should get credit for this amount. 
26. In regards to the marital home of the parties, the parties have stipulated the value to be 
$ 150,000 on November 1, 2002, and the Court so finds. The balance owed on the first mortgage was 
$88,803, which was also not disputed by the parties. The Court finds that the net equity in the marital 
home to be $61,197. 
27. The business evaluator found the furniture business value to be between $300,000 and 
$325,000. The parties' counsel both stated that the evaluator said it was worth $300,000 on the 
phone when they each questioned him about that and the Court considers those representations 
together with the Court's finding that this business was and is a failing venture. Based on the 
foregoing, the Court finds the appropriate and fair value of the business to be $300,000 on November 
1,2002. 
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28. Having considered the foregoing and having made findings in regards to the assets, both 
personal and business, the debts, both personal and business, and each parties' respective obligations 
and credits, the Court makes the following findings and conclusions of law in equitably dividing the 
assets and debts of the parties in this matter as of November 1, 2002. 
A. Debbie is awarded the marital home which value is $150,000, less the first 
mortgage of $88,803, leaving a total net equity of $61,197. One-half Q/i) of that equity should be 
awarded to Alan in the sum of $30,598.50, which should become payable upon the house selling, 
Debbie moving from the home, cohabits, remarries, or the minor child turns eighteen (18), whichever 
occurs first. No interest shall accrue on the lien of $30,598.50 in favor of Alan, but which is a set 
amount of money that will be paid within about three (3) years or sooner. 
29. Now in regards to the businesses of the parties, the Court finds it appropriate and 
equitable to divide he same as follows, giving each party the credits and obligations set out above. 
Alan should be awarded the furniture business. The furniture business value is $300,000, less the 
Robert and LaRue debt_of$101 J2^93^J^hich_wa&^ffirmed by both parties-hy testimony and their 
respective written statements, less the other business debts and credit card debts found above totaling 
$109,134.63, which Alan should be ordered to assume and hold Debbie harmless therefrom, which 
leaves a total net equity in the business of $89,739.44. Debbie's net equity from the business is 
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$44,869.72, which represents 50%. However, from this net equity, the Court needs to look at other 
factors and equities./Debbie received $50,000 more than Alan from the hotel sale. jMan paid 
$5,890.40 after the separation that directly benefitted Debbie and for which he should get credit, 
which totals $55,890.40, which should be paid by Debbie to Alan, less the amounts Alan already 
received from the bank accounts and tax refund of $5,761, leaving $53,009 total that is owed to Alan 
by Debbie. 
30. However, when the Court applies the equity Debbie has in the furniture business awarded 
to Alan of $44,869.72 against the amount owed to Alan from Debbie of $53,009, her net equity in 
the business is totally wiped out because she has already received $8,100 more than Alan. Alan 
would be owed the $8,100 in total net equity from the two (2) businesses. The Court is not required 
to make things even or divide equities exactly and it declines to do so in this matter. The Court will 
not require Debbie to pay this $8,100 difference, it is just fiction, a nominal amount given the figures 
the Court has dealt with in this case and the equities applied. Alan is awarded the business with the 
debts listed above and Debbie does not have to pay him back for the monies she has already received. 
He doesn't have to pay her back for the tax refund and the checking account balance, this is what the 
Court believes is fair and equitable in this matter and the Court is going to find that the division set 
forth herein is fair. All of these figures the Court sees are questionable things that everybody had 
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argued about all day like the back rent owed, which I have clearly found in Alan's favor. He may 
never pay his parents the rent and loan owed, but it clearly is a legitimate debt that was owed by the 
parties on November 1, 2002. That is why I have divided and found as I have so that there is a clear 
break between these parties and the entanglements they have encountered during the marriage. This 
division allows for a clean break. When the minor child reaches eighteen (18) years of age or any of 
the other events occur outlined above, Debbie will owe Alan his equity from the marital home, 
otherwise the parties are divorced and no longer connected in any businesses or entanglements. 
31. The parties have acquired personal property during the marriage. Alan will draft two (2) 
lists of the personal property items including those in the home, the personal property at the store, 
and the truck and van. Said lists will be presented to Debbie on or before March 8, 2004. Debbie 
will pick which list of property she wants and should be awarded the same. Alan then will be 
awarded the property identified on the remaining list. Each party should be awarded the personal 
property they have acquired since separation in November 2002. 
32. Each party should bear their own costs and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
33. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are 
required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
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34. Should either party fail to abide by the provisions of a Decree of Divorce issued herein, 
that party should be liable for indemnification of the other, including attorney's fees and Court costs 
incurred in the enforcement of the Decree of Divorce. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties in the above-entitled matter, and the parties are 
entitled to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
2. The parties should be awarded a Decree of Divorce, to become absolute and final upon 
entry by the Court herein. 
3. The Court concludes that all other issues of dispute have been resolved by the Court 
pursuant to the above Findings of Fact. 
DATED this day of July, 2004. 
JUDGE PAUL D. LYMAN 
District Court Judge 
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TO THE PARTIES ABOVE-NAMED: 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2), this proposed Order will be filed with the Court five days 
after service upon you. Your objections, if any, must be filed with the Court within five days after 
service. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this day of July, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing proposed Amended Findings Of Fact & Conclusions Of Law, postage prepaid, to Gary 
H. Weight, Attorney for Respondent, at 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 84603-0200. 
SECRETARY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this day of July, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing signed Amended Findings Of Fact & Conclusions Of Law, postage prepaid, to Gary 
H. Weight, Attorney for Respondent, at 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box"L", Provo, Utah 84603-0200. 
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THE COURT: Ckay. 
MR. WEIGHT: Totally liquidated. That will leave some 
personal -- or some business property; a truck, a trailer, a 
computer, some of those other items. I guess that then becomes 
personal property, and how that should be divided I guess is an 
issue. 
THE COURT: That's fine. Attorney's fees at issue or 
not? 
MR. NEELEY: I think usually we would say each pay 
their own. 
THE COURT: Okay, each pay their own, and a name --
MR. NEELEY: There is one issue. 
THE COURT: Will there be a name change? 
MR. NEELEY: No. 
THE, COURT: No? Okay, go ahead, sir. 
MR. WEIGHT: There is an issue of — this may just 
go into personal property, but there is an issue of the tax 
refund that came shortly after the separation, and we think 
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their — they all signed an agreement as to what their shares 
were. She received her share. 
If it's disproportionate that's not our fault. We 
agreed to what her share was. So we now disagree that we 
can bring that back in to try to modify any amount that she 
received from that settlement or have it affect any amounts 
that she may receive from additional assets. I think that's a 
— we can argue that, I guess, is what — 
THE COURT: Yeah. I think you need to argue that, and 
why are we picking November 1st, 2002? 
MR. NEELEY: It's when they split. 
MR. WEIGHT: Separation date. 
MR. NEELEY: Separation. 
THE COURT: So you want me to make these divisions as 
of that date, and not as -of today? 
MR. WEIGHT: With respect to the — 
THE COURT: And both parties agree with that? 
MR. WEIGHT: — with the business, Fashior Furniture 
THE COURT: With the — okay, and that's stipulated to? 
MR. WEIGHT: That's right. 
THE COURT: Because normally I would divide it as 
of today, what the assets were today, but if you folks were 
r 
agreeing that it's November lrt, 2002, on the record stipulating 
to it, that's fine. I'll do it as of that day. 
MR. NEELEY: For Fashion Furniture that's what we've 
-34-
1 and did that for two years. 
2 That they had an opportunity to sell the business. 
3 They no longer wanted to be partners. His brother Jerry — 
4 Alan and his wife wanted to be out and no longer wanted to 
5 be partners. So they have actively attempted to sell the 
6 business. They've had several offers. 
7 They eventually got an offer last year that they all 
8 wanted to take. They attempted to get Mrs. Larsen to negotiate 
9 with them — Mrs. Debra Larsen, the defendant — to negotiate 
10 with them and to help them in closing the transaction. It was 
11 an LLC that Mr. Chamberlain had drafted for them, and pursuant 
12 to that LLC the majority are able to sell the property. 
13 She was still putting up a resistence to that, and it 
14 came to the point where they were going to lose the sale, and 
15 Jerry Larsen agreed to give her $200,000 from the sale proceeds 
16 in order to save the sale. Alan Larsen would testify that he 
17 received $150,000 from the sale of the motel. So together the 
18 mania] receipt was $35^,000 tcta1 **"-w tue sa1^ of the motel. 
19 MR. WEIGHT: Your Honor, can I interpose my objection. 
20 I have already indicated to the Court that I would object to it 
21 as part of the proffer, and ask that it be stricken for this 
22 reason. He's testified about some of the negotiations which 
23 have occurred, and the parties have been paid, and that is not 
24 an issue. That has never been reserved as an issue. We've 
25 been before the Court and represented that that was done. 
-35-
1 So it can't come back in, but if it's going to come 
2 back in, if the Court's going to allow that testimony, then I 
3 have a copy of the escrow instructions and waiver agreement 
4 that I will submit to the Court as an additional exhibit, which 
5 is signed by all the parties, and agrees in there that her 
6 share is $200,000. It makes no mention of any disproportionate 
7 division. 
8 Makes no mention of any distress -- I mean, a worry 
9 of losing a sale. It's a hand — or an arm's length, clean 
10 transaction between all these parties where they agreed based 
11 upon evidence we presented and their evidence, that her share 
12 in that business was $200,000. 
13 MR. NEELEY: He can offer that, and I don't dispute 
14 anything he said, but the fact of the matter remains that that 
15 was an asset that was obtained during the marriage — 
16 THE COURT: I'll look at your evidence, because if — 
17 that would be — I think that's reason -- or not reasonable — 
1
 8 relevant -vidence. So I'J1 go * z):-* -= 1^-1:. ^- -h:v.d 1 _ll3_ 
19 that and show me that. 
20 MR. NEELEY: But our response is, objection would be 
21 that these parties received proceeds from an asset that was 
22 totally obtained and (inaudible) during the marriage, and the 
23 $350,000 is what came to the parties from that asset. 
24 MR. WEIGHT: Assuming — the second part of my 
25 objection goes to this, your Honor. He represents today that 
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THE COURT: The hangup, Mr. Weight, is this. This is 
a proffer. If you don't want to accept it, you want to cross 
examine Mr. Larsen as to what he actually received, I'll put 
him under oath. I'll allow you to do that. If he's lying, 
then it's perjury and it would make a difference, okay? 
MR. WEIGHT: Well, and I appreciate that, your Honor, 
and I know we can do that, but I think — my objection doesn't 
go to whether or not he got 150 necessarily._ We don't know 
that except for his work. My objection is that this part of 
the case is settled. We aren't even dealing with this. She 
got her share, he got his share. If they're disproportionate 
it was done by agreement. 
MR. NEELEY: That had nothing to do with the divorce 
action. 
MR. WEIGHT: It does. 
MR. NEELEY: That was an LLC to split up --
MR. WEIGHT: But the LLC they owned, as a marital 
asset, their portion of the LLC. 
THE COURT: Okay, let's go onto some other issues. 
MR. NEELEY: All right. 
THE COURT: And you can provide whatever documents you 
want to show the other. 
MR. WEIGHT: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Neeley. 
MR. NEELEY: In addition to the $42,000, your Honor, 
-42-
1 MS. LARSEN: Alan and she had that together. 
2 MR. WEIGHT: Who wrote it? 
3 MS. LARSEN: Alan. 
4 MR. WEIGHT: Okay. It's the handwriting of Alan Larsen 
5 written on this exhibit, and my client will testify that the 
6 exhibit is an exhibit that was produced by Mrs. Larsen, the 
7 mother. It's her own document, and at the top of it is written 
8 1050 per month, it looks like, 7/7/02, and the conversation 
9 that occurred regarding that notation was that she said at that 
10 time there would be no rent due prior to July 7th of ^02, but 
11 rent would be at the rate of 1050 a month after that, and if it 
12 was paid and continued to pay it, that the back rent would be 
13 forgiven. 
14 So we show the Court this document, and then we also 
15 have attached to it the history of the payments, and the next 
16 two pages after the first page, and then there's two pages 
17 after that -- or three pages after that that show the amounts 
16 I — and again, your Honor., these °1~ca t> e disputed docur^nU:, 
19 disputed documents Mr. Larsen -- or Mr. Neeley says he doesn't 
20 want in because they're part of the settlement negotiation, but 
21 these were not prepared by my client. These were prepared by 
22 Mrs,. Larsen or by Alan Larsen. 
23 I The last page, the very 1 ast pj^e_sJiows a composition 
24 of the rent that would be due if the Court gives credit for the 
25 payments that are reflected on the documents in the last four 
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years. So that's what her testimony would be and that's what 
these exhibits purport to show. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. NEELEY: I don't know (inaudible). Could I look at 
that exhibit? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. WEIGHT: Should I just put it there. 
THE COURT: You want it? 
MR. WEIGHT: Yes. 
MR. NEELEY: Is it part of Exhibit 2, this right here? 
MR. WEIGHT: Yes. 
MR. NEELEY: This? 
MR. WEIGHT: Yes. 
MR. NEELEY: Your Honor, I'm objecting to the — to 
that exhibit. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. NEELEY: And let me state the objection, and I'll 
nivp t-hp Court --
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. NEELEY: — another exhibit to verify what I'm 
saying. My objection is that these documents were given to 
Counsel both before Mr. Weight entered the picture and after 
Mr. Weight entered the picture, and I'm going to offer 
Petitioner's Exhibit No. 26. 
On the top of that exhibit, it comes from Ogden 
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Carpets. That is Jerry Larsen. He did the accounting for the 
senior Mr. and Mrs. Larsen. The date on that is 11/03. Those 
documents were prepared and presented to Counsel and his client 
and Counsel before in settlement negotiations. That's what 
their intent was for, and that's how they got them, and I 
object to his use of those settlement negotiation documents to 
draft any of the other documents. 
MR. WEIGHT: And my response to that would be is he 
saying that these documents are not true and accurate and 
reflect the actual accounts then --
MR. NEELEY: But he's purporting them to be that they 
agreed that -- with their theory of the case, that all payments 
ought to be applied as they are received. We offered a total 
computation of all the things of the parties, and parties were 
talking about that settlement negotiations, what's owed to 
the Larsens because of all the back rent and all of the — 
everything they've borrowed them over the years. So we 
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X, okay? Which then indicates to me a willingness to pay 
something above whatever would be the math you're — you're 
saying you're willing to do, but not as much as the other side. 
I don't see any of that in discovery. 
MR. NEELEY: Because — 
THE COURT: Do you see what I'm saying, Mr. Neeley? I 
don't see any kind of a — 
MR. NEELEY: I do, because the response that we got 
back — and I'll — if you want me to, I will enter a document 
they gave back, and it was prepared by Debbie in settlement 
negotiations, and she uses our figure of $101,000 owed to the 
Larsens, but I don't think that's fair to do because that's 
settlement negot_ia_tian-s-, If she gave us back a document that 
says, "Likely the inventory is this. Here is what the Larsens 
-- here's what we owe the Larsens, $101,000," and that's a 
document she prepared. 
THE COURT: You can certainly put her on the stand and 
ask her if at th?t point-sh" --j-csc -- r>~ "he f^t like c-
whatever.— I don't know what the circumstances were. 
MR. NEELEY: We were doing settlement negotiations, 
though. I don't -- I mean, I think the rules preclude me from 
asking her about it, but if we're going to open that door then 
I will ask her that. I've got the documents she prepared. 
THE COURT: Frankly I — 
MR. WEIGHT: My understanding about his argument, your 
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in 
it's different than what it would be 
settlement negotiations. 
COURT: See, 
it's a fact 
Mr. Neeley, 
— if it's a 
' s- a settlement offered 
I th 
that' 
fact, 
ink he's answered 
s the trouble 
it's a fact, 
I'm 
it's a 
for some different figure, 
I will net consider that. No;,, I see what you're dsying, i& 
Ms. Larsen does not say today that she felt like they owed 
$101,000. Do think she's not going to say that? 
MR. NEELEY: No, she's not going to say that. She's 
going to -- I'm sorry, he just put their exhibit. They're 
saying that — they're using our exhibit we used in the 
settlement negotiations to support her statement today that 
she only owes $16,000 to the Larsens, when in settlement 
negotiations she said she owed $101,000, and her document says 
that. 
THE COURT: And what is this document you've got? Is 
it a letter? 
MR. NEELEY: Well, it's a computation just like that. 
THE COURT: So it's more stuff like this. Well, I can 
ask her the same question. Is it a fact or is it net a fact? 
I'm going to allow you to introduce whatever you want, Mr. 
Neeley. 
MR. NEELEY: Okay. 
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It's been 
ional stuff 
letters 
repared." 
I'm not 1 
you give me 50 or 
7^ or ?c;, and eve:, though I think it's this, it's — " because 
that's the stuff we usually see in settlement negotiations. 
MR. NEELEY: I agree that's usually what we see when 
there's reasonable minds. 
THE COURT: That's right. So go ahead, Mr. Weight, 
please. 
MR. WEIGHT: Your Honor, let's go to the next exhibit, 
No. 13, is a group of documents. The first of that is the 
summary. Then the remaining pages are backup. 
If the Court will look at the first page, what we're 
doing here is attempting to help the Court understand the 
income of Mr. Larsen. Mr. Larsen was paid by Fashion Furniture 
a salary, but in addition Fashion Furniture paid certain of his 
personal debts, which for IRS purposes might give him a lower 
income for tax recording, but not for computation of income for 
child support or alimony. 
So we've set forth on the page by month the additional 
payments Fashion Furniture made for Mr. Larsen that were more 
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MR. WEIGHT: 2000. 
THE COURT: — 2000, that is the combined earnings of 
you two, not --
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: — just your earnings? 
THE WITNESS: Correct. 
MR. WEIGHT: After that they incorporated and started 
paying wagc=>. 
THE COURT: Okay. Got a couple more questions. 
THE WITNESS: Sure. 
THE COURT: The exhibit you've got. Do we — 
THE WITNESS: This one? 
THE COURT: Yeah. Your mother wrote this, right? Is 
that her writing? 
THE WITNESS: It is on the top, yes. 
THE COURT: Okay, except for — 
THE WITNESS: Except for my writing on the very top. 
THE COURT: The little scribble at the top with the 77. 
All right. Does someone have a copy he can be given, and if 
you want to look over his shoulder, Mr. Neeley. When I look at 
page 3 of that exhibit I see what is 7 — you know July of '02, 
and in column 3, which is called "Payment," I see four straight 
months of $1,050. So I assume that that means that you paid 
and she credited you with paying that $1,050 for those four 
months; is that right? 
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THE WI,PTN7SSS: Okay. 
THE COURT: And then you made two more. Whose computer 
printout is this -- these pages? 
THE WITNESS: That's Jerry's. 
THE COURT: Jerry's? What did Jerry have to do with 
this? 
THE WITNESS: He was just helping put this on a spread-
sheet, make sense of it. 
THE COURT: Okay. On January of '02 you have $42,650 
applied to rent; is that right? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, that's — that amount would have 
been towards rent. 
THE COURT: Okay, and that's the $42,650 that came from 
where? 
THE WITNESS: That money is money that we got from 
borrowing, I think, from my parents, or at least that amount of 
money. 
THE COURT: So they loaned you that money. If I 
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understand the testimony right, you stuck that in the hotel? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: But when you paid it back to them, for some 
reason it was credited towards the rent? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, that's right. 
THE COURT: Why? 
THE WITNESS: Because we owed so much rent. 
•liiE COURT: okay. 
THE WITNESS: That was intended to catch up, get it 
paid. 
THE COURT: And that was the money that was loaned out 
in September; is that correct? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, that is. 
THE COURT: So you two, from everything I can see from 
this, mixed and mingled the accounts at the furniture store, 
along with the accounts from the hotel; is that right? 
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at least $20,000 sometimes to pay for store debts? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. From personal credit cards? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you used the vehicle --
A. I think more than that. 
Q. — you used that as collateral and put that back into 
the business also? 
A. Exactly. That's what I did. 
MR. NEELEY: Okay. I think that's all the questions. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions you want to ask 
him, Mr. Weight? 
MR. WEIGHT: No further questions of this witness. I 
call LaRue Larsen. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mrs. Larsen, if you'll come forward, 
ma'am, stand in front of her and raise your right hand, please. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony 
you're about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
please. 
THE COURT: Go ahead and have a seat over there, 
MR. WEIGHT: Did the Court get back No. 12? 
THE COURT: Yes. Which is 12? That's the one I was 
-85-
just looking at? Yeah. Do you need it? 
MR. WEIGHT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
LARUE LARS EN, 
having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR WEIGHT: 
Q. Will you please state your name. 
A. LaRue Larsen. 
Q. And you're the mother of the petitioner in this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I've handed to you what has been admitted as Exhibit 
12; do you see that? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Is the handwriting on the document except for what is 
right at the very top your handwriting? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it your practice to make a ledger like this one 
and to give it to your son and his wife each year? 
A. I'm not sure that I gave it to them, but I tried to 
keep track of when they paid rent. 
Q. Until beginning of 1994, which is the entry on the top 
of the page, is that when you first started this particular 
exhibit? 
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No, I have others at home. 
I'm sorry? 
I have others since 1984. 
Okay, but that page right there, do you think that 
started in 1994? 
I'm not sure. It probably was. 
You see the first page at the top. It says, "1994," 
and then there's some montns and dates listed beIcT*» that. 
A. I may have gotten — gone back to this on this time. 
I'm not sure. 
Q. I just asked you if-could you see those dates. 
A. Which dates? 
Q. At the very top, and then the word date you see the 
No. 1994. 
A. Yes. 
Q. That represents the year 1994; is that correct? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And then below that there's a 1-9 and 5-6; do you see 
those? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Isn't it true that in that year you started this 
ledger, and then you filled in that information each month as 
— you filled it in as those months occurred? 
A. I didn't. I think that I'd gone back and written down 
what I've had down before. 
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Q. Pick a needle. Do you know if you did or are you not 
sure? 
A. I haven't kept adding on it, because it's — I've gone 
back and filled in where I've kept record of them. 
Q. Okay. Look at the bottom where you come to the year 
1999. Do you see that? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. IL shows ar. entry on 7/6 of '99 and 11/29 of '99. The 
first entry is $5,000 and the second entry is $10,000; do you 
see that? 
A. Ye.s. 
Q. And is that a payment that was made to you by Alan and 
Debra; those two payments? 
A. I think so. 
Q. And then — 
A. It must be. 
Q. Then at the very bottom there's 2001, and under that 
it says, "1-17," and then "$12,600"? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And then to the right of that "for year 2000"? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
right? 
In other words — 
In other words they were paying late all the time. 
This is a late payment that you credited for 2000, 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
one more 
A. 
Q. 
saysf 
' A. 
"S 
Because 
And then 
I put a question mark 
if 
Are you at 
Uh-huh. 
And near 
eptember-
Uh-huh. 
the 
x01. 
you'll look at the 
the third page? 
middle of the 
// 
pag 
there. 
next 
e it's 
That's 
page, 
got 
right 
and then 
the 
-88-
go 
date that 
g There i s the ent ry oi $1,050, and men to the r ighu of 
t h a t $42,000; do you see t ha t ? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. That's the payment that was made -- or-I mean, a loan 
that was made by you and your husband to your son and daughter-
in-law? 
A. Right. 
Q. 
do you 
A. 
Q. 
of the 
A. 
Q. 
doesn't 
A. 
Q. 
i that yo 
And then you go down to where it says, "January A02;" 
see that? 
Uh-huh. 
And to the right of that, should be in the very middle 
page, there is an entry of $42,650? 
Uh-huh. 
That represents a repayment of the loan, $42,000; 
it? 
I think so. 
And when the payment was made, ycu commented to Debra 
u've paid 42 -- you've paid $850 additional, and she 
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says, "That's for interest." You said you weren't expecting 
any interest, and she says, "Well, but you deserve it." Do you 
remember that conversation? 
A. I didn't know that I wasn't — yeah, I don't know. 
Q. Do you remember her commenting to you that she was 
paying you interest for the $42,000? 
A. Yes, I remember a comment and she was saying interest. 
Q. Okay. Then did you ever tell her thct: you were going 
to apply the $42,650 toward rent as opposed to the loan payment 
that you were talking about that she paid? 
A. No. 
MR. WEIGHT: That's all. ' 
THE COURT: Mr. Neeley. 
MR. WEIGHT: Your Honor, I just have two more questions 
or one, maybe. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
Q. BY MR. WEIGHT: Okay. On top of that same exhibit, 
Mrs. Larsen, on the front page, can you see an entry that says, 
"Due/' a 
it looks 
A
* 
Q. 
side; do 
A. 
nd then there's some lines and then there's "1050," and 
like the words "per/mo, 7/7/02;" do you see that? 
Is it on the very front? 
Yes, the very, very top of the page at the right-hand 
you see that? 
I don't. 
THE COURT: It's in different handwriting. 
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Q. BY MR. WEIGHT: Right here. 
A. Oh, here. 
Q. Yeah. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Is that your handwriting? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you recall a conversation you had with Mr. Larsen 
'.;hcn he icti.;ned irom a i rip he took to Las Vegas, and where 
you told him that he and his wife would no longer have to pay 
any back due rent as long as they would be faithful in paying 
of rent after that date? 
A. No. It really wouldn't be fair to our family or to 
the other kids to forget about that grant that they owed. I 
always --
Q. That's not my question whether it's fair or not. I'm 
asking you if you did make a representation to your son that 
you were going to forgive that debt? 
A. No. 
MR. WEIGHT: Okay, that's all. 
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A. Right. 
Q. How much — do you recall how much it was at first? 
A. When we were first starting out, we set the -- Robert 
figured the rent for the space that we had — for the space 
Alan and Debbie had to be 1400. Then they were having a hard 
time, so he reduced the rent to 700. Then they deducted the 
amount of the — our cancer insurance payments. So.it made the 
rent 650. My husband said we needed to always raise the rent, 
but they didn't se-em to be able to make the rental payments. 
In fact, they were borrowing money all of the time, and so we 
just didn't ever raise the rent.. 
Q. Okay, but you did raise it after that to 1,050? 
A. When Jerry and Diane moved out of the building then 
they were using that space. 
Q. Okay. Then they got more space, you raised the rent? 
A. Right. 
Q. Okay, to 1,050? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And they continued to pay your insurance? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they continued to do that? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Now, while Debbie was running the store and paying the 
bills, did she ever tell you she was net going to pay you your 
rent? 
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A. No. 
Q. You can't remember having conversations with her about 
the payment of rent? 
A. We tried to settle up with the rent, rental payments, 
and tried to meet and do it, but we had a hard time getting 
together. 
C. Okay. The exhibit that Counsel showed you, the 2nd and 
3ld page, was that prepared by — who prepared the Znd and 3rd 
pages of that? 
A. Jerry put it on my computer as a spreadsheet. 
Q. Okay, and that was based on the information that you 
gave him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. From the records that you kept? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In regards to exhibit -- oh, the exhibit that we 
talked about that has the — I think it's No. 6. It has the 
amount due. 
THE COURT: Exhibit 6, okay. 
Q. BY MR. NEELEY: I'm going to hand you what's been 
marked Exhibit 6, okay? Do you recognize that document? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you work on that yesterday and last night and this 
morning? 
A. Yes. 
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1 I MR. WEIGHT: Your Honor, I'll object to this testimony, 
2 and I'm going to do it on the basis that I've raised objections 
3 previously. That is, that this part of the case is not before 
4 the Court. It's been resolved. That has been paid, and there 
5 is simply nothing here for us to address. 
6 THE COURT: I think there is. The testimony is quite 
7 clear that everything was mixed and mingled. There were 
i 
8 I payments that were showing up as this or that, applying it 
9 towards the loan payment, but it looks to me like its paying 
10 may be applied towards rent. I don't know how you can sort the 
11 two out, and that's just 'from the testimony I've heard. I do 
12 think it's relevant, and I am going to consider it. So go 
13 ahead and ask the questions, Mr. Neeley. 
14 Q. BY MR. NEELEY: How did it come about that you needed 
15 to work — well, first, what kind of relationship did you guys 
16 form in regards to the motel? 
17 A. RCI was a partnership, limited liability company, 
18 and we — with four members; Alan and Debbie and my wife and 
19 myself. 
20 Q. Alan and Debbie had it before you got involved? 
21 A. Right. 
22 Q. Correct? They had been partners? 
23 A. They had two partners, actually. 
24 Q. Okay, and then when you got involved did ycu infuse 
25 additional capital into the partnership? 
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the last two pages appear to be the actual offer to purchase. 
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I'm getting there. 
THE COURT: No, hang on. Hang on. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
THE COURT: So what's your objection now? 
MR. WEIGHT: My objection is this, your Honor. He's 
testifying that they gave her what she wanted. In other words, 
like, "We were under pressure to sell this property. She was 
making demands, and so we gave her what she wanted." That's 
not what this agreement says. It says something quite 
different than that in paragraph 4. 
THE COURT: I don't know that it contradicts. It says, 
"The parties represent and agree that she'11 get that much 
money." 
MR. WEIGHT: The words I'm looking at — 
THE COURT: And they were to — 
MR. WEIGHT: — says, "Receive as her share." So if 
she received that as her share, that assumes that everybody 
agreed that that was what her one-quarter interest of the 
business to be, her share, $200,000. All of the negotiations 
that went into arriving at that are merged in that paragraph, 
and the $50,000 he's testified about and all these other 
representations are merged into an agreement that that's her 
share. 
THE COURT: Okay. So if — and since he and — so if I 
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sustam what you're saying, if I do that, what have I got here? 
What I've got is --
MR. WEIGHT: What I think you've got is you've got to 
throw out his testimony, because — 
THE COURT: Well, how do I figure — since these guys 
are mixing money back and forth, I've got to come up with 
something. Do I just simply say, "Fine, $200,000 to her and 
$200,000 to him"? Because I'm willing to do that, but I don't 
think that's what you want, and I'm more than happy to say 
that both of these people get $200,000 credit for the motel 
interest, period. 
That — and if you want that, we're done with the 
questioning. I'll take it as the evidence, and I'll move on, 
or we could hear what he's got to say, but I don't think you 
can have it both ways, Mr. Weight. 
MR. WEIGHT: Well, I don't know (inaudible). We don't 
know what he got, but what I'm — 
THE COURT: That's ex — and I've got to come up with 
some number, because I'm going to find that these parties owned 
interest in these things and they were married at the time this 
happened. So either I'm going to get testimony to come up with 
it or I'm going to say they both got $200,000. 
So your choice is I either hear what's going on, and 
I may decide that yeah, it was some different number, or I'm 
going to just give it 200 each and be done with it, because as 
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I see it, this is a package deal, and you want to separate this 
out, and given the evidence I've heard today, I can't sort this 
out. I cannot just sequester this one little thing and say, 
"She gets $200,000 free cash." I can't do that. 
MR. WEIGHT: Okay. Well, if the Court can't do that, 
then I guess --
THE COURT: You see what I'm saying? I just — these 
parties, had they kept separate accounts, had they never done 
anything to comingle funds, had they never done anything like 
that, I would have bought what you've — but the evidence isn't 
that way. 
MR. WEIGHT: Well, my position on that is this, your 
Honor. It got to a point where there's going to be one marital 
asset (inaudible). We entered in negotiations with the parties 
that were buying this property, and then we also entered into 
negotiations between the four owners of the business; Jerry and 
his wife and Alan and Debra. 
THE COURT: Yes, sir, you're right. 
MR. WEIGHT: And there were a lot of numbers that were 
put back and forth between these parties on what they thought 
their claims were and what they thought the equity of the 
business was so it could then be divided four ways to give it 
to the four partners. 
They finally settle on a number that we presented, and 
the number that we presented was that we think -- now they say 
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we had disputes with their numbers, but all we were really 
trying to do is take the sales price of 4.2 million dollars, 
subtract out all of the reasonable expenses that should be 
subtracted out to get to an equity, and then divide that by 
four. 
We did all of that, and the process resulted in my 
client getting $200,000. Now they're going to say, ,vNo, we 
overpaid her. 
THE COURT: Given what you just said, if the amount was 
divided by four and it's $200,000, I'll give her $200,000, he 
gets $200,000 when I figure out my total numbers. Fair enough 
with me. Then in that case, Mr. Neeley, I won't accept any 
more testimony on this matter. 
MR. WEIGHT: That's what we think that the motel part 
of this case is all about, but what I'm concerned is --
THE COURT: (Inaudible) — 
MR. WEIGHT: — I'm not sure I agree with the Court's 
statement that you're going to say at least get 200 and --
THE COURT: I'm going to do a little sheet and say — 
because this is in the middle of the divorce, it's 2003, and if 
I put 200,000 on her ledger, I'm going to put 200,000 on his 
ledger, call it quits and be done. If you don't -- because you 
don't want me to hear any more of his testimony and I've not 
heard any other dollar figure other than that, and I'll be 
happy to do that. We'll be done with Jerry's — at least this 
-135 
1 line of testimony. Mr. Neeley can certainly ask him about 
2 other things. I don't know what he's going to say. 
3 MR. WEIGHT: Well, I don't either. All I know is that 
4 she had $200,000. It was by this agreement she got it, and it 
5 was after all of the negotiations represented her one-quarter 
6 interest in both the motel property, and six acres adjoining. 
7 . THE COURT: Okay, I'm going to sustain the objection. 
8 Don't ask any more questions about this. Each of them will ' 
9 have $200,000 on the final ledger sheet as their interest in 
10 the hotel. 
11 MR. NEELEY: What he should receive? 
12 THE COURT: Yes, sir, that's right. 
13 MR. NEELEY: Even if he didn't receive it? 
14 THE COURT: We're taking no more testimony on it. 
15 That's — when I do my ledger, that's how we'll do it. Any 
16 other questions you want to ask Mr. Larsen? 
17 MR. NEELEY: No. 
18 THE COURT: Or Mr. J e r r y La r sen? 
1 9 MR. NEELEY: No. 
20 THE COURT: Mr. Weight , a n y t h i n g y o u ' d l i k e t o a sk him? 
2 1 MR. WEIGHT: No. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you very much, sir. You can have a 
23 seat. Okay, Mr. Neeley, we're still to you. Anything else 
24 you'd like to offer? 
25 MR. NEELEY: Yes, I would call Mr. — well, I could 
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proffer. 
THE COURT: Why don't we do a proffer, because we're 
running — 
MR. NEELEY: Okay. Mr. Larsen would proffer, your 
Honor, that he does not have a two-year degree. He did attend 
Snow College, but he never got a two-year degree. That he 
doesn't have any other training other than what he's received 
as a salesman in the furniture business. That after he 
completes — that his brother has agreed to pay him $1,500 
a month, that's while he liquidates -- a month, while he 
liquidates the inventory from Fashion Furniture. Affer that 
he will be unemployed. He did not tell the custody evaluator 
he was going to Las Vegas, because he does not intend to leave 
the area. He hopes to find a job selling somewhere here. 
THE COURT: Okay. You'll accept — is there basically 
rebuttals of those particular things? Did you want to cross 
examine him on those issues? 
MR. WEIGHT: I don't need to cross examine him, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, Mr. Neeley? 
MR. NEELEY: No. 
THE COURT: Over to you, Mr. Weight. Anything else 
you'd like to present? 
MR. WEIGHT: Your Honor, I didn't ask my client about 
Exhibit No. 27. If the Court will get that, I'll just tell the 
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what her testimony was going to be. 
THE COURT: Which one is 27? 
MR. NEELEY: That's the — 
THE COURT: Oh, okay, good. That's this most recent 
Okay, go ahead. You're going to make a proffer about 
Please do. 
MR. WEIGHT: (Inaudible) wasn't initially (inaudible) 
THE COURT: Yeah, okay. 
MR. WEIGHT: And she will testify that before we agreed 
finally, that the business would be evaluated and we would use 
the value of inventory as of November Vr, 2002. Before'that 
all occurred and we reached that agreement, we actually did it 
on an order to show cause hearing. 
We were trying to figure out how much my client 
should get for Fashion Furniture. We had taken care of the 
motel matter and were trying to resolve Fashion Furniture. 
So these exhibits, the one No. 27 was prepared simply as her 
calculations of what she thought the value of the business was, 
what she thought she should receive. 
That exhibit I think doesn't really help us at all, 
because the — as part of the negotiation, whereas the other 
exhibit, No. 26, is simply a business record. That would be 
her testimony, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Neeley? 
MR. NEELEY: Nothing further, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. WEIGHT: Your Honor, my summary 
— was written for my benefit so I could go 
to the Court, and I'll go through it simply 
understands what I'm doing here. 
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of the argument is 
through and argue 
so that the Court 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WEIGHT: We indicated to the Court that in the 
telephone conversation we had with Bruce Hughes he told us 
that the value of the inventory as of 11/1/02 was $300,000, 
the .report he has, which is admitted as an exhibit. He states 
in bold on the second page that he gives it a range of 300,000 
to 325. 
I did not -- I subpoenaed him, but I released him from 
the subpoena because I was confident that he would testify just^ 
exactly what his reports states. So we proffered it, but the 
argument that I've made, or this summary here, I'm using the 
$300,000 figure. If the Court after reading the evaluation, 
the business evaluation determines that more than 300,000 
should be the starting number, then the Court can add to my 
bald calculations my clients share. 
We start, your Honor, with the rent issue. That's the 
first deduction I show from the business equity value. It's 
our position that the amount of $13,600 is owed, and we come to 
that number this way. For four years the total rent of -- that 
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was paid at the rate of $1,050 would be $50,400. We deduct 
from that the amount of $15,000, which comes in Exhibit 12, 
showing that there were a 5,000 and a $10,000 payment, and 
then in addition they wanted $12,600, and then $4,200, which 
represents payments made July, August, September, October, and 
right after -- well, I can show the Court where he does it. 
On Exhibit 12 — 
THE COURT: UKay, I'm looking at Exhibit 12. 
MR. WEIGHT: And it's page 3 of the last group of 
pages. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WEIGHT: January, February, March, April of 2003 
there's acknowledgment that that amount of money was received, 
and we claim that that should be deducted. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. WEIGHT: That amount of deduction — 
me. 
THE COURT: Okay, slow down. You just 
You said 15,000, 12,600, and 4,200? 
you've lost 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
WEIGHT 
COURT: 
WEIGHT 
COURT: 
WEIGHT 
COURT: 
WEIGHT: 
: Yes. 
Those are the amounts? 
That's right. 
From the $50,400? 
That's correct, and then --
And those figures came from page 3? 
Well, if you're looking for all the 
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the 
000 
000? 
MR. WEIGHT: That's the 15. 
THE COJRT: OKay. 
MR. WEIGHT: Then on page 3 where you've seen 4,200. 
THE COURT: Fine. 
MR. WEIGHT: Okay. 
THE COURT: Let's see, page 3, 4,200? 
MR. WEIGHT: At the very bottom of the page at the 
corresponding number. 
THE COURT: You bet. Show me — oh, page 4. 
MR. NEELEY: I don't have a page 4. 
MR. LARSEN: Where does it show that? 
THE COURT: Right there. Okay. 
MR. NEELEY: This is page 4? 
THE COURT: It's page — it's not 4 either. It's 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6. 
MR. WEIGHT: The summary of it all, your Honor, is on 
the very, very last page of Exhibit 12. 
THE COURT: Okay, I'm with you. All right. 
MR. WEIGHT: And so the IS -- tnere's $50,400 minus 
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the 31, 8000 -- 31,800, excuse me, which consists of the 15, 
12,6 and the 42. Leaves a balance of $18,600 that is owed to 
Mr. and Mrs. Larsen, and that's the first thing I put in my 
summary of the argument. 
THE COURT: Okay, I'm with you. I understand that. 
MR. WEIGHT: Right. 
THE COURT: Slow, but I pick it up eventually. 
MR. WEIGHT: I'm glad I don*t nave to be in your 
position. Under that you see it says, "Zero important." 
Takes our argument that there was some agreement that all 
past due would be forgiven as of 7/7/02. It's paid current 
from that date, so (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WEIGHT: Credit card debt, we represent that from 
the amount of the business equity, business value should be 
deducted 22,742.23. That is on Exhibit 3. We both stipulated 
to that number. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WEIGHT: Then we've deducted it as a business debt, 
and their number of $10,731.14 on Exhibit 11, we accept that, 
and then the big squabble is over the business debt, which is 
the amount that I had indicated to the Court as 28,566.87. I 
get that number by looking at Exhibit 31 and Exhibit 6. 
If I may, your Honor, on Exhibit 6, Exnibit 6 is a 
large exhibit that has a big paperclip on the left-hand side. 
